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Unethical Consumption & Obligations to Signal1
Holly Lawford-Smith
[This is the penultimate draft of a paper to appear in  Ethics & International Affairs.  The 
correct citation is:  Lawford-Smith, Holly. 'Unethical Consumption & Obligations to Signal', 
Ethics & International Affairs, forthcoming.]
“I'm not into jewelry or anything. (I'm such a hypocrite). I... there is one jewel that I think is stunning, 
that I... it's just, like, a classic... but um, it's just gorgeous, you know, it's rare, it's only found like on 
the tip of the tailbone of Ethiopian babies, they... they debone the babies. I know, that sounds so bad 
when you say it out loud, but, no, if you saw it? ... I have a... moral issue with it obviously, because 
they're treating the... unions that debone the babies really bad. Pick your battles I guess”.
Sarah Silverman, Jesus is Magic.2
Introduction
Many of the items that humans consume are produced in ways that involve serious 
harms to persons. Familiar examples include the harms involved in the extraction 
and trade of conflict minerals (for example, coltan or diamonds), the acquisition and 
import  of  produce  (for  example,  coffee,  chocolate,  bananas,  or  rice),  and  the 
manufacture of goods in sweatshops (for example, clothing or sporting equipment). 
In addition, consumption of certain goods (such as fossil fuels and the products of 
the agricultural industry) involves harm to the environment, to future persons, and to 
current persons in low-lying and developing countries, by way of their impacts on 
climate change.
There are many different ways to try to bring about  an end to the harms 
involved in  the production of  such goods.  These include reforming international 
trade rules,  changing a  country's  domestic  laws and polices,  instituting domestic 
economic levies on harmful goods (“nudging” consumers toward ethically-produced 
goods), and so on. But these are all top-down solutions, and states and international 
organizations are currently failing to make many, if any, such changes. Such top-
down changes may work in an ideal setting. But in our non-ideal context, we may be 
better off looking at bottom-up solutions3 That is why in this article I will start at the 
bottom, with the individual whose ordinary choices about how to travel, what to eat, 
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what to wear, where to shop, and which policies to support all cause her to confront 
the  possibility  of  involvement  in  these  harms  to  the  environment,  non-human 
animals, and persons. What should―or, more strongly, what must―she do?
I take the claim that an individual has a straightforward duty of justice not to 
consume unethically-produced goods, premised upon her general duty not to violate 
others'  negative rights or important interests, to be a non-starter―for the reasons 
explained in Shelly Kagan's “Do I Make a Difference?”,4 namely,  that not every 
purchase is a violation in that way. If the individuals has a duty not to consume 
unethically-produced goods, this duty must be given an alternative justification.
In the second section I map out a few different approaches, all of which I 
take  to  be  promising  avenues  for  generating  duties  in  individuals  to  consume 
ethically. I hope that this will be helpful to those interested in taking up the problem. 
I think the last approach is the most promising and will spend the third section of 
this article developing it. Specifically, I argue that as a first step in collectivizing to 
act against unjust global labor practices an individual ought to signal to others her 
commitments to ethical consumption. In section four I ask whether some signals are 
too cheap to function as a step toward collectivization, and defend the deliberate 
consumption of only ethically-produced goods as a moderately costly and therefore 
reliable signal. In the last section I consider a challenge to the proposal in terms of 
whether it imposes unacceptable costs on consumers.
Five Promising Approaches
In  this  section  I  briefly  map  out  five  promising  approaches  to  generating  an 
individual's obligations when it comes to ethical consumption. I outline each and 
then sketch what I take to be the major obstacles that need to be overcome with all 
of them. I see these obstacles not as decisive reasons not to take those approaches 
but simply as issues to be worked through. I defend the final approach because I take 
it  to  be  the  most  promising  of  the  five,  but  individuals'  obligations  to  consume 
ethically may well be established by multiple moral theories: all the more reason to 
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do so.
Task  responsibility.  Philosophers  make  a  distinction  between  “blame 
responsibility” and “task responsibility”, where the former assigns responsibilities 
on  the  basis  of  culpable  involvement  in  a  harm,  while  the  latter  assigns 
responsibilities without blame, on the basis of being the  most appropriate person to 
do something to address the given set of harms.5
In our case, consumers cause the harms mentioned above. Their purchases 
cause companies to produce more goods, and those goods are produced in a way that 
involves harms.6 But while each individual is a contributor to this joint causation, 
this is not sufficient to make her culpable, because she (usually) lacks the further 
features necessary  for culpability, such as intending the harm, negligently risking 
the harm, or foreseeing the harm.7 Still, we might make use of her role in jointly 
causing  the  harm:  perhaps  it  is  a  sufficient  condition  for  her  bearing  task 
responsibility  for  the  harms  resulting  from  the  joint  action.  The  idea  of  task 
responsibility has been used as a strategy in arguing for citizens' responsibilities to 
provide redress for their state’s historical injustices.8 In the same way that citizens 
are the right people to do something about their state’s historical injustices, we might 
think that consumers are the right people to do something about the injustices of the 
corporations from which they buy.
There is, however, a serious practical problem in trying to run this argument 
as  it  relates  to  consumers,  as  opposed to  citizens.  In  the  case  of  the  state,  task 
responsibility gives us a  post hoc  justification for using citizens' taxes in a certain 
way.  But  there  is  no  institution  comparable  to  the  state  with  authority  over 
consumers. We could build the cost of redress for harms into the price of goods, 
making unethically-produced goods more expensive and ethically-produced goods 
cheaper, but this would still in effect treat the symptoms and not the cause: if people 
were happier to  pay the higher  price,  the harms would persist  and then later  be 
compensated for. What we really want is a way to bring the harms themselves to an 
end: to stop harms to current and future persons and the environment by radically 
reforming the consumer environment.
3
Benefiting from injustice.  Another way to approach the problem is via the 
concept  of  individuals'  benefiting from injustice.  There have been several  recent 
attempts to clarify the idea that it  is wrong to retain certain kinds of benefits of 
certain kinds of injustices.9 We can think of non-fair trade coffee beans, for example, 
as “stolen goods,'” insofar as those who grow them are not paid a fair price for their 
labor.  In this  case the difficulty  is  in specifying a  normative baseline relative to 
which we count others' acts against the coffee farmers as injustices, and count third 
parties who do well out of those injustices as beneficiaries.10 Consumers of non-fair 
trade coffee pay lower prices than they would for fair trade coffee, so in that sense 
they benefit; and shareholders in sweatshops commit injustices against their workers 
by paying them below a fair wage and subjecting them to unacceptable working 
conditions.
The  picture  is  more  complicated  than  that, however,  for  at  least  some 
employees of at least some sweatshops are better off than they would have been had 
the sweatshop not existed at  all.  Thus,  we end up with an incongruous situation 
where we seem to both commit  an injustice against someone while  also making 
them better off. We can accommodate both intuitions by maintaining that we cannot 
both harm a person and make her better off (both are relative to the same baseline), 
while at the same time accepting that we can commit injustices that make people 
better  off.  Classic  paternalism  seems to  be  exactly  that:  for  example,  a  medical 
intervention may be a violation of a person's right to bodily integrity and therefore 
an  injustice,  but  may nonetheless  make her  better  off.  Thus  the  fact  of  making 
sweatshop workers better off than they would have been otherwise does not preclude 
obligations to remedy the injustices simultaneously committed against them (such as 
the violations of their labour rights).11
Complicity. A third promising strategy uses the concept of complicity, taking 
individual  consumers  to  be  complicit  in  the  harms  caused  by  domestic  and 
international corporations and companies. This is akin to how the law distinguishes 
principal offenders from accomplices. I can make myself complicit in your criminal 
act by assisting you in some way, by performing a minor role, by encouraging you, 
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and so on. Some have employed the idea of complicity to think about, for instance, 
the responsibility of soldiers for the harms caused by their state’s military.12 Others 
have  used  the  concept  to  generate  a  weak  membership  condition  for  collective 
agency, and thereby joint responsibility for collectives' acts.13 To diagnose unethical 
consumption in terms of complicity, we would take the principal offenders to be the 
corporations who run sweatshops, who purchase conflict minerals, who pay unfair 
prices for coffee and chocolate beans, and so on. And we would take consumers to 
be  complicit  in  these  harms  via  their  purchases,  which  show  support  for  or 
encouragement  of  those  harms  by  sustaining  demand  for  the  products―at  least 
when consumers are aware of the unethical production history, but perhaps even 
when not.
The difficulty with this strategy, I think, is that it conceives of the harm as 
external to consumers in a way that fails to capture their actual role. Corporations 
harm people in order to maximize profit; they couldn't maximize profit by harming 
people if consumers wouldn't touch anything produced in a way involving harm to 
persons (current or future). Corporations produce goods they expect consumers to 
buy, and they produce them in the way they do because they expect consumers not 
to  object,  at  least  not  to  the  extent  that  they  would  change  their  consumption 
practice.14 Changes in what consumers are willing to accept could entirely change 
the production process. That fact is not captured by the complicity diagnosis, as far 
as I can see. 
Consumers would be better  modeled  jointly  as the  principal cause  of  the 
harms, but this is not enough to make it the case that each consumer has duties alone 
to consume ethically. The group “consumers” is not organized in a way that allows 
for collective responsibility for this jointly caused harm.15
Impermissible risking.  The fourth strategy is the least developed, at least in 
the moral- and political-philosophical literature that I am aware of. It involves the 
idea of impermissible risking of certain interests of others. We usually determine 
moral  and  legal  harms  in  terms  of  actual  outcomes:  for  example,  a  sweatshop 
employee is harmed when the factory collapses and her arm is broken. But we might 
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also be interested in determining harms in terms of the outcomes that could just as 
well have resulted from the actions but in fact did not, for example when the factory 
is  in  a  state  of  disrepair  but  happens  to  collapse  overnight  when  there  are  no 
employees  present.  David  Lewis  explores   this  idea  in  the  context  of  criminal 
punishment, arguing that criminals should be punished for their actions and not for 
the actions'  outcomes over  which they lack control16 as  do Larry Alexander and 
Kimberley Ferzan in suggesting reform to the criminal law in terms of culpable 
risking of another's legally protected interests ( for example, her rights).17
Th idea of impermissible risking provides an interesting further element to 
Shelley Kagan's characterization of what―if anything―an individual does wrong 
when making a contribution to a large-scale joint harm like factory farming.18  Kagan 
argues that it is an individual's actual causing of a certain “threshold” to be crossed 
that matters,19 for example by purchasing the 100th t-shirt  sold by a retailer,  and 
consequently triggering a re-ordering for 100 more such t-shirts by the retailer from 
the  sweatshop  that  produces  them.  But,  he  says,  sometimes  we  are  not  in  an 
epistemic position to know what that threshold is, and how our action intersects with 
others' actions in approaching it, in which case we can only go off the probability of 
harm our action poses. If it is wrong to risk certain of others' interests quite aside 
from that risk in fact materializing, then we have a further reason to say that such an 
action is wrong. Of course life is risky in multiple ways, and many of our ordinary 
actions come with some risks of doing harm to someone. But it would be possible, I 
take it,  to determine particular  categories of actions that pose risks to certain of 
others' important interests, such that those actions were impermissible on grounds of 
risking.
Actions that are good candidates for this type of impermissible risking are 
those taken to acquire luxury goods when they come at a risk of others' basic human 
rights, or their ability to meet subsistence needs.  When I purchase any cellphone 
other than the new Fairphone,20 I increase demand for conflict minerals, and create a 
risk of a relevant threshold being crossed so that in fact more children are forced 
into armed militias, or down mines, and so on. It might be permissible to pose such 
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risks in the pursuit of a life worth living  but it is surely not permissible to pose them 
in pursuit of luxuries we could easily do without.
Obligations to signal.  The  last  strategy,  and that which I think is the most 
promising,  is  justified  by  our  mere  capacity  to  assist,  but  in  a  special  way:  via 
collectivization.  Consumers  together  can―and  have―changed  production 
processes,  but  it  is  not  necessarily  the  case  that  a  given  consumer  alone  could 
change anything simply by boycotting a certain unethical corporation or product, or 
by supporting a certain ethical corporation or product, or by taking political action 
against the domestic or global labor standards or trade rules which permit them, and 
so on. In this sense unethical consumption is like climate change. The greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions of billions of people all  over the planet feed into a central 
system and affect  the  global  temperature.  Groups of  people together  can reduce 
GHG emissions in a significant way. One person's refusal to fly, or to eat meat, for 
example, likely won't make a difference to global emissions. The  collectivization 
argument is  that  there  are  some morally  important  ends  we can pursue only by 
acting collectively, and that this fact alone gives us reason to come together.21 Once 
we have  formed the  kinds  of  groups  capable  of  reliably  producing  the  relevant 
outcomes―specifically,  collective  agents―those  groups  will  come  to  bear 
obligations to secure those outcomes. (At that point there will be a further question 
about how the obligations of the collective agent “distribute” back to its members. 
The distribution question makes sense between collective agents and their members, 
in a way that it fails to between uncoordinated aggregates of individuals taken as a 
group  and  their  members.  The  former have  the  control  required  to  secure  the 
relevant outcome and distribute the roles necessary to seeing that outcome secured. 
The  latter lack control, and thereby lack the ability to distribute roles between the 
individuals composing it.)
When there are morally important  ends we could secure together but not 
alone, such as ethical global consumption, or the mitigation of the worst predicted 
effects  of  climate  change,  an  individual  has  an  obligation  to  take  steps  toward 
collectivizing. The collective, once formed, will have a duty to act in pursuit of the 
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morally important ends in virtue of its mere capacity to do so; individuals have a 
duty to take steps toward collectivizing in virtue of their capacity to do so. The good 
that  individuals  have  the  capacity  to  (take  steps  toward)  bring(ing)  about  is  the 
existence of the collective with its much greater capacities, and the good that the 
collective  will  have  the  capacity  to  bring  about  is  the  securing  of  the  relevant 
morally  important  ends.  There  are  several  steps  to  collectivization,  including 
signaling  conditional  (and  sometimes  unconditional)  willingness  to  cooperate; 
persuading  others  to  take  steps  toward  collectivizing;  responding  to  another's 
attempt to “trigger” conditional commitments  into actions―or acting as the trigger 
oneself;  and proposing decision-making procedures  (for  the establishment  of  the 
collective's  ends,  distribution  of  roles,  revision  of  commitments  or  extension  of 
powers, and so on) capable of synthesizing prospective members' commitments into 
a collective commitment. In the rest of this article I focus on developing the first of 
these, the obligation to signal, in more detail. 
Obligations to Signal
When it  comes to large-scale,  jointly-authored  moral problems such as factory-
farming, sweatshop production, and climate change,22 it is easy for the individual to 
feel helpless. Even if she sincerely wishes things were otherwise, she may wonder 
what  she  could  possibly  do  to  make them so.  She  may  recognize  that  there  is 
something people could do together about the harms, but believe that others would 
not be willing to get together and do it. And for each such individual who sincerely 
wishes things were otherwise, this may be true. This is where the first step in the 
“collectivization” chain comes in: she ought, at the very least, not to allow herself to 
be a reason for others to believe that no one is willing to get together and act.  She 
can  do  this  at  low  cost  to  herself,  by  signaling  a  conditional  commitment  to 
cooperate  with others. This signal  prevents others from believing  that their  own 
cooperative actions would be futile, and sends the message that collective action is 
possible. The signal may be as simple as wearing a t-shirt printed with a particular 
message;  asking  certain  kinds  of  questions  in  restaurants  (especially  when  in 
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company); starting an online petition or signing an existing one; building a webpage 
to coordinate a political protest or adding one’s name to the list of attendees.
Where there are no, or few, collectives already set up, signaling will be the 
first step in forming groups capable of acting. Where there are capable collectives 
already set up, or collectives that could easily be reformed from the inside in order 
to be capable, signaling will serve to attract greater membership, or to begin the 
process of reforming the organization’s capacities.23 There are several well-known 
groups  working  on  ethical  consumption  (notably  the  Fairtrade  Foundation,  No 
Sweat, the Rainforest Alliance, PETA, and the CarbonNeutral Protocol), so the most 
obvious signals will be to join these kinds of organizations.
For some recent examples of public signaling, consider the viral Kony2012 
and #BringBackOurGirls campaigns; the spontaneous protest against UKIP before 
the 2014 European elections  (which involved UK voters mailing heavy items to 
UKIP's  freepost  address  and  sharing  photographs  of  the  packages  online);  the 
overfunding of the solar roadways project;24 the ALS Ice Bucket Challenge (which 
raising  raised  over  $41  million  globally)25 and  the  subsequent  Rubble  Bucket 
Challenge in solidarity with Palestinians. 
Many of our actions are normative, in the sense that they send to others the 
message  that  we think this   is  the  right  way to  live.  Not  all  of  our  actions  are 
normative  in  this  way,  of  course:  for  example,  a  person's  preference  for  white 
chocolate over milk chocolate may be simply that, a matter of personal taste. But a 
preference for dark chocolate over milk chocolate will in certain contexts be read as 
motivated  by   the  choice  to  avoid  products  of  the  dairy  industry.  The  causal 
consequences of these apparently minor signaling actions are momentous, because 
their  growth  is  exponential.  Any  individual  signaling  in  a  particular  social 
environmental can expect her signal to have an effect on some proportion of those 
who encounter it (the proportion will depend on the individual, correlating with her 
social  status,  charisma,  perceived  intelligence,  perceived  virtue,  social 
attractiveness, and other factors). In turn, those who encounter the given signal and 
adapt their behaviour accordingly can expect their own signals to have an effect on 
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some proportion of those who encounter them. And so on, and so on. Social change 
happens when people's perceptions of what other people value are modified, and 
when  those  perceptions  shift,  social  esteem,  reputation  effects,  and  other  social 
incentives all kick in to motivate behavioural change.
Elizabeth  Anderson  makes  a  similar  point  in  her  2014  Lindley  Lecture 
advocating  “contentious  politics.”  As  she  points  out,  activities  like  petitioning, 
publicity campaigns, theatrical performances, candlelight vigils, litigation, political 
campaigns, street demonstrations, boycotts, teach-ins, sit-ins, picketing, strikes, and 
building occupations all serve the purpose of lessening perceived support for a social 
norm: part of our reason for conformity is others' expectations, so as we see others 
publicly  reject  the  norm,  the  strength  of  our  reason  for  conformity  declines. 
Similarly,  those  still  seen  to  be  supporting  the  old  norm after  it  has  lost  public 
support  may  face  steep  social  costs  in  terms  of  a  loss  of  moral  authority,  peer 
esteem, and social legitimacy.26
The examples that Anderson gives are all of actions that impose a moderate 
cost  on  those  performing  them,  whether  in  terms  of  time,  money,  risk,  or  the 
cognitive costs of social conflict. But some of the examples I gave earlier are much 
less  costly.  Wearing a  t-shirt  printed with  a  political  message,  signing  an online 
petition, giving a little money to a worthy cause, or sharing a campaign video on 
Facebook, are all actions that require relatively little from the person performing 
them. Such actions are indeed often dismissed as “slacktivism”—social activism at 
rock-bottom  prices,—with  the  implication  that  “slacktivists”  are  lacking true 
commitment. Is there any reason to think that such signals are so cheap as to be 
ineffective?
Is the signal too cheap?
Robert Frank has argued that for a  signal to function as reliable—to be treated as 
credible by the recipient of the signal—it must be hard to fake, that is, either difficult 
or costly.27 An example of a reliable physiological signal in humans  is the micro-
expressions caused by genuine emotions that show up on the face before they can be 
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replaced by deliberate expressions.28 An example of a reliable social signal of being 
a trustworthy cooperative partner  is an individual's  public act of generosity.29 At 
their  most reliable,  signals will be impossible to fake and thus a perfect guide to a 
person's quality, character, and intentions.
The problem with cheap signals, like signing an online petition or sharing a 
campaign video on Facebook,  is that they are not necessarily a good guide to a 
person's genuine commitments, because they can be done flippantly, or for reasons 
other than identification with the cause, for example to support friends. This does 
not  pose  a  particular  challenge  for  contexts  in  which  there  are  already  capable 
collectives  established.  When  I  express  publicly  my  support  for  an  existing 
organization advocating  ethical  consumption,  I  am  making  an  unconditional 
commitment  to  solidarity  or  identification  with  that particular  cause. When  an 
individual shares a “No Sweat” campaign video through one of her online social 
networks,  she  is  making  a  public  statement  about  what  her  values  are,  what 
commitments she has and believes worth having. These signals seem to be read as 
credible no matter how cheap they are. But what about in cases where there are no 
capable  collectives  already set  up?  Set  aside  the  groups already mentioned,  and 
imagine  we  are  interested  only  in  collectivizing  into  either  domestic  groups  of 
consumers of unethically-produced goods, or one global group of such consumers, 
so that the group can coordinate all of its members into action against the relevant 
injustices. In these cases, at least, must the signal be costly?
I said that when there are no capable collectives already established, a signal 
of conditional willingness to cooperate (“I will if sufficiently many others will”) is 
the first step in a series, culminating in the emergence of a collective agent capable 
of acting in pursuit of the morally relevant end. The problem is that if the signal is 
too cheap, it may not be read as genuine by those who encounter it, and thus may 
not  be  efficacious  in  prompting  similar  commitments  and  eventually  collective 
action. Imagine encountering an individual wearing a t-shirt printed with the slogan 
'I'm Reducing My Greenhouse Gas Emissions!' (an unconditional commitment), or 
the  slogan  'I'm  Prepared  to  Offset  My  Emissions  to  Zero  if  You  Are  Too!'  (a 
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conditional commitment). Momentarily, you're impressed that she has brought the t-
shirt, and is wearing it about, ostensibly as a signal to others of her environmental 
commitments. Then you discover, around the next corner, a group of environmental 
activists  handing the  t-shirts  out  for  free.  This makes  you wonder:  is  she really 
reducing her GHG emissions? That is, is she really willing to pay to offset them if 
enough others do too? Or did she just like the idea of a free t-shirt? If others have no 
reason to read the signal as reliable, it will not be efficacious in prompting others to 
action. Either there will be no spread of the signal through social networks, or there 
will be a lot of cheap signaling that never results in collective action.
This  suggests  that  to  be  an  effective  initial  step  toward  building  new 
collective agents, the signal required of individuals should come at some cost. A 
signal that requires the signaler to take on even a moderate cost will be more reliable 
than a  signal  that requires no cost  at  all,  and likewise a signal  that requires the 
signaler  to  take  on  severe  cost  will  be  more  reliable  than  one  that  requires  a 
moderate cost.  In principle, all we need to solve a cooperation problem within a 
particular (uncoordinated) group is for everyone in the group to be conditionally 
committed to doing a part if sufficiently many others will likewise do a part,  for 
those commitments to  be common knowledge,  and for  someone in  the group to 
trigger the conditional commitments into collective action once there are sufficiently 
many of them. When I am a member of the relevant group, as I am of the group of 
global  consumers  of  unethically-produced  goods,  I  need  to  communicate  my 
conditional commitment so it can become part of others' common knowledge. I can 
communicate my conditional commitment in a way likely to be taken as sincere by 
others in the group by taking on a non-trivial cost. The best signal of all might be the 
public  buying  of  ethically-produced  products,  or  the  public  boycotting  of 
unethically-produced products.30 The more difficult this is in the context, the more 
reliable the signal. In a city full of vegan cafes, choosing a vegan cafe for lunch will 
not necessarily be read as a normative commitment to veganism―the cafe might 
just be the best nearby. In a city with few vegan cafes, choosing a vegan cafe, or 
interrogating the waiter about what they can offer vegans, will likely be read in that 
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way.
An  individual  should  buy  her  t-shirts  from (for  example)  PeopleTree  or 
American Apparel because the chances are that by doing so she will get someone 
near her do so too (and even if not to literally copy her purchase, at least to take the 
cause seriously, and signal that she would also be conditionally willing to cooperate 
together with others to make an impact against the relevant harms).31
What  is  interesting  about  this  proposal  is  that  it  gives  a  consequentialist 
justification to actions that are normally taken to have mere expressive value;32 and 
in at least some cases, it gives an alternative justification to the duties we would 
have had if a more straightforward justification in terms of duties of justice had been 
credible.  An  individual's  obligation  to  signal  her  conditional  willingness  to  get 
together with others in pursuit  of a morally important end has a consequentialist 
justification,  but  of  a  broader  sort  than  is  typically  offered.  We're  not  solely 
concerned, at this point, with the likely impact of an individual's purchase on a re-
ordering threshold, which may thereby implicate her in harms to persons done (as 
with the t-shirt  example noted above).  Rather,  we are concerned with the  likely 
impact  of  a  given  action  of  hers  on  the  actions  of  others.  A public  signal  of 
conditional willingness by her ensures that she is not a reason for others to think that 
cooperation is impossible, and it simultaneously places normative pressure on others 
to signal in a similar way, which raises the chance of a group capable of acting in 
pursuit of the relevant end being formed. The world is a little better for each such 
person who signals. There is less epistemic warrant for the belief that “no one else 
will act,” and this fact transforms what might otherwise have been characterized as a 
threshold problem (in which some good is achieved only when sufficiently many 
people perform an action) into a problem in which each individual has reason to act 
unilaterally. She has a reason to signal regardless of whether others are signaling, 
even  though  she  might  lack  a  reason  to  contribute  to  eradicating  the  injustice 
directly  when  others  are  not  also  contributing.33 When  the  best  signal  is  a 
contribution to eradicating the injustice, we have an alternative moral vindication of 
an action that would otherwise not have been morally required.
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In summary, for all the cases in which an individual can send the clearest 
signal by publicly buying certain kinds of products, or publicly boycotting certain 
kinds of products, she will have an obligation to do so. This is the best (but not the 
only) way of her satisfying her obligation to take steps to collectivize. An obstacle to 
collectivization is each person believing that no one else is willing to get together 
and act; an individual can disabuse others of this belief by signaling her conditional 
willingness to cooperate with them to act against it. While the case for unilateral 
action against unethical consumption in the form of acting on duties of justice not to 
buy  looks  to  be  untenable,  the  case  for  unilateral  action  against  unethical 
consumption in the form of acting on obligations to signal, as a part of the fuller 
story  involving  obligations  to  collectivize,  does  look  to  be  so.  Additionally,  it 
delivers the same content, at least some of the time.
The relative cost of boycotting
At the end of section one, I said that attempting to generate a straightforward duty of 
justice for individuals not to purchase unethically-produced goods, premised on the 
violation of negative rights or interests caused by those purchases, was a non-starter. 
That is because it is not true of every purchase (and not even true of most purchases) 
that  it  violates  another's  rights  or  compromises  their  relevant  interests.  Still, 
individuals are in an epistemically opaque situation when it  comes to  the harms 
visited  upon others  as  a  result  of  their  daily  purchases,  so  perhaps  it  would  be 
enough to justify a duty of justice not to make such purchases by simply noting that 
buying a given object or service can be expected to violate rights, or that for every 
10 purchases at least 1 can be expected to violate rights, and so on. We can take this 
thought  seriously  and  still  conclude  that  it's  overly  demanding  to  suggest  that 
individuals  have  a  duty  to  boycott  unethically-produced goods.  Such duties  will 
often be too costly relative to what such a boycott stands to achieve. Assuming that 
she cannot avoid injustice entirely, a given individual has to choose which of the 
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many  injustices  of  which  she  is  a  cause,  or  to  which  she  is  a  contributor,  to 
prioritize.
Let’s imagine that,  because of the chance of a purchase of a t-shirt being a 
trigger  of  a  morally  relevant  threshold  (for  example,  causing  the  re-ordering of 
further t-shirts),34 or the chance that a re-ordering is counterfactually dependent upon 
that purchase,35 or the chance that, together with many other consumers' actions, this 
purchase  is  a  joint  cause  of  an  injustice  (taking  a  strict  liability  account  of 
culpability),36 an individual thereby declines to buy that t-shirt. But if we focus only 
on  the  causal  connection  between  one  individual's  purchase  of  one  sweatshop-
produced t-shirt  on one occasion,  not  purchasing that  object  is  not  enough of  a 
difference-maker to the injustices in question to justify it being required.
In  the third section of this article, I gave a justification of boycotting via 
obligations to signal conditional willingness to cooperate, which in at least some 
cases tracks exactly the same content as  a straightforward duty  of justice not to buy 
(dismissed in my opening section). The challenge to be addressed in this section, 
then, is how the action of boycotting unethically-produced goods can be too costly 
(not a big enough difference-maker) to be a duty of justice, and yet not too costly to 
be justified as part of the requirement to collectivize . The content of those duties, 
which  is  to  say,  the  actions  required  of  individuals  in  order  to  fulfill  them,is 
identical.
This  challenge  depends  entirely  on  whether  we  think  demandingness 
thresholds are set in a way that is objective or a way that is relative.  There are 
various approaches to this problem . For example, Jan Narveson talks in terms of a 
“beneficence budget,” which suggests a fixed sum of money, effort, or time, that can 
be spent in the pursuit of morally important ends.37 If we think of demandingness in 
this way, the content of a categorical negative duty to boycott unethical products (or 
to buy ethical products only) would be identical to the content of an obligation to 
signal in at least some cases. We would therefore have to agree that these come at 
the exact same cost, so that if one is not required because it is too demanding, so is 
the other. That would defeat the project of offering an alternative justification of 
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unilateral boycotting/buying.
Robert Goodin, on the other hand, talks in terms of relative costs, comparing 
the good at stake against the cost of pursuing it.38 For Goodin, the only limit is that 
the cost to the individual not be disproportionate to the value of the good being 
pursued.  The good being pursued when we attempt to justify a straightforward duty 
of justice not to buy goods produced unethically is the avoidance of harm. The good 
being pursued through (the first step of) collectivization is avoiding other people 
believing that no one is willing to cooperate. We assess the relative cost  differently 
for  the  two  justifications.  On  the  first,  the  cost  to  me  of  boycotting  unethical 
products, or endorsing ethical products, is compared against the end of keeping me 
free from implication in harms to persons. That action will cost me something, and 
has  some  probability  of  making  no  difference  at  all  to  the  harms  involved  in 
unethical consumption (either by falling short of a threshold or by overdetermining 
the crossing of a threshold), and some probability of making me a joint cause of a 
re-ordering threshold being crossed.  The overall  expected utility of my action is 
often, if not always, insufficient to make the boycotting/buying the thing to do.39 On 
the second, the cost to me of boycotting unethical products, or endorsing ethical 
products, is compared against the end of ultimately forming a collective capable of 
acting  against  the  harms  of  unethical  consumption.  According  to  this  line  of 
thinking,  a collective would be capable of making a bigger difference to the re-
ordering thresholds  via  its  unilateral  purchasing action.  Furthermore,  through its 
political  power,  a  collective  would  be  able  to  enlarge  itself  and  trigger  further 
unilateral  actions  and  possibly  even  widespread  social  norm change.  (Anderson 
characterizes social movements as always having a collective agent at their center.40) 
Note  also  that  when the  signal  is  only  to  show solidarity  or  identification  with 
existing collectives, it may be so cheap as to raise no concerns about demandingness 
at all. 
Relative to the end of collectivization, your action actually has a much higher  
chance of being efficacious, because there is a reasonable chance that you were not 
the only one whose primary reason for inaction was hopelessness. It will not always 
16
be true that signaling is more effective (in some cases it  will  not be fulfilled by 
unilateral boycotting, and in some cases there will not be enough signaling to be 
worth triggering into group formation), but it sometimes―perhaps often―will. In 
those cases where there is no point in one person acting alone, the best one can do is 
take a step toward bringing  about a world in which sufficiently many people  signal 
their  opposition  to  practices  of  unethical  consumption.  In  those  worlds,  the 
collective  can  then  make  a  significant  difference,  for  example,  the  reform  of 
sweatshops, the eradication of factory-farming, and / or the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions.
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